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ABSTRACT
The Effect o f  Self-Generated Information on the
Plausibility o f Unlikely Autobiographical Events
by
Michele Dawn Sheremeta
Dr. Murray Millar, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Plausibility o f unlikely events was investigated using a pre-test and post-test o f the 
Life Events Inventory (Garry, et al, 1996). Students (N = 55) at the University o f 
Nevada, Leis Vegas completed two sessions, including a plausibility scenario phase in 
which they were asked to describe four events chosen by the researcher from the pre-test 
on the basis o f reported plausibility. Two o f the events were rated low in plausibility and 
two were rated high in plausibility. Results indicate that plausibility ratings increase more 
for low rated items when participants are asked to describe those items than for control 
items which are not described.
I l l
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Our sense of who we are is largely determined by memories o f what has happened in 
our lives. Although this point is generally accepted by psychologists, there are 
disagreements about the accuracy o f  memories. Most recently, the recovered memory 
debate has focused on whether “recovered” memories o f childhood abuse are accurate or 
not. The debate was stirred by court cases involving victims who claimed to have been 
abused and to have forgotten the abuse, only to remember it at a later time (Loftus & 
Ketcham, 1994). In several cases, the defendants were convicted on the basis o f this 
recovered memory alone (Loftus, 1993). A number o f researchers challenged the validity 
o f these claims by pointing to studies that have consistently shown memory to be 
inaccurate in many situations. For instance, research on eyewitness suggestibility has 
routinely found that participants can be induced to claim that they saw objects during a 
witnessed event that were, in fact, only suggested to them in the context o f post-event 
questioning (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978; Zaragoza & Lane, 1995). However, 
other researchers have suggested that traumatic memories may be exempt ftom these 
inaccuracies because they are encoded using different mechanisms than those used in 
everyday memories (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). Clinicians have also suggested that 
memories o f  abuse are too traumatic to fabricate, and that reported childhood abuse is 
generally accompanied by other behavioral problems which have been linked to that
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
abuse. Thus, a central question in this debate is whether it is possible for someone to 
falsely remember an event that never occurred.
Memory Creation
A number o f researchers claim to have evidence that memories o f whole events can be 
implanted. For instance, Elizabeth Loftus (1993), attempted to implant a memory o f 
being lost in a mall in one person, a young man named Chris. She enlisted Chris’s 
brother to tell him that he had been lost in a mall and rescued by an old man when he was 
about five years old. Chris reported what he remembered every day in a diary, and after a 
few weeks he had created a vivid memory o f  this experience. His memory included 
emotional and contextual information such as his fear at being lost and a description o f 
the man who helped him find his family. Chris also rated his memory for this false event 
as being very clear, with higher clarity ratings than he gave to true memories that had 
occurred in his childhood. This procedure was replicated with slight modifications for a 
larger group o f participants (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). The suggested event, again, was 
being lost in a mall as a young child. The subjects’ parents were asked to provide 
information about a typical shopping trip, including where the shopping trip took place, 
what kind o f stores were visited, and which family members were likely to have gone on 
this type o f shopping trip. The parents also verified that the subject had not been lost in a 
mall as a young child. Using this information, a scenario was presented to the subjects, 
who were told that their parents had reported this event as something that really happened 
and were asked to try to remember the experience. Overall, 25% o f the subjects claimed 
to have a memory o f  the event.
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Loftus’ findings were criticized on the grounds that subjects may have been 
remembering an actual incident when they were lost, because this experience is not at all 
unusual for children. In a  similar manipulation which addressed this criticism, Hyman, 
Husband, & Billings (1995) responded by attempting to implant memories for events that 
were unlikely to have occurred. A  false positive event or a false negative event was 
suggested to each participant. The positive event was a birthday party at age five with 
pizza and a clown. The negative event was an overnight visit to a hospital at age five 
with a high fever and possible ear infection. The parents o f participants were polled to 
determine a number o f true events and to determine whether or not the events to be 
suggested had happened. The participants were interviewed twice, with requests to try to 
remember a number of events, one of which had never happened to them. By the second 
interview, 20% of the subjects had created a description o f  the false event. The same 
number o f false positive and negative events were described, that is, there was no 
indication that emotional context affects whether or not a suggested event will be 
described as a true event. Furthermore, participants who created a description o f a false 
event could not accurately identify this event as false fi’om the original list o f events 
while individuals who did not create a description o f a false event were able to accurately 
indicate which event fi"om the original list was false.
The consistency o f results from these two early memory creation studies suggested that 
memory creation is, in fact, possible, and later research has attempted to examine factors 
that increase or decrease the likelihood of falsely remembering an autobiographical event. 
One possible factor affecting memory creation is the source of suggestion. Both of the 
aforementioned studies include telling the participants that a family member had reported 
the event as a true event. This may provide the suggested information with an element of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
credibility. Additional identified factors include individual differences (Hyman & 
Billings, 1995), use o f guided imagery (Hyman & Pentland, 1996), and production of 
self-relevant information at the time o f  the memory description (Hyman, Husband, & 
Billings, 1995).
Because a minority o f participants come to believe the suggestions, one possibility is 
that those who accept the suggestions differ in some way from those who do not. 
Personality variables have been explored with regard to their relation to memory creation. 
For example, in Hyman & Billings (1998) participants completed four personality 
measures, the Creative Imagination Scale (CIS) (a measure o f hypnotizability), the 
Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS), the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), and the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS). Similar to earlier studies, information 
about participants’ past experiences was received fi'om their parents. The participants 
were then asked to describe all they could remember about a small number o f true events 
and one false event. They were then scheduled for a second interview and asked to 
continue thinking about the events. Results show that both scores on the CIS and the DES 
were highly related to the creation o f false memory, while scores on the TAS and SDS 
were not. Although the CIS hypothetically measures hypnotizability, the scale instructs 
individuals to use creative imagination. Thus, whether one or both o f  these factors 
affects memory creation is not clear. In fact, both factors have been implicated in other 
types o f false memory. For instance, imagery has been linked to misremembering in 
eyewitness studies. Additionally, research in hypnosis suggests that individuals in a 
hypnotic state are more suggestible to false information than those not in a hypnotic state. 
(Lyim & Nash, 1994). The DES has been shown to be a reliable indicator o f dissociative 
tendencies (Bemstein & Putnam, 1986). Dissociation has been linked, not only to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
memory creation, but also to fantasy proneness. Lynn & N ash, (1994) suggest that 
susceptibility to leading questions is higher in fantasy-prone individuals. Hyman presents 
another explanation which is that individuals who have h igher scores on dissociation may 
be more willing to use constructive memory processes, w hich  in turn could contribute to 
the memory creation process.
Although individual differences can affect the likelihood o f falsely remembering an 
autobiographical event, individual characteristics are only o»ne part o f memory creation. 
The manner in which individuals examine and process the suggested information has also 
been implicated as a factor. The effect of imagery has been  addressed by Hyman & 
Pentland (1996) in a typical memory creation paradigm. Again, several true events and 
one false event were presented. However, the instructions g iven  to one group for the 
false event were to form a mental image o f the event, then t«o describe this mental image. 
The second group was instructed only to think about the false  event quietly for a  moment. 
For the first group, the results are similar to earlier memory creation studies in that 25% 
of these participants falsely remembered the suggested event. In the second group only 
9% of these participants falsely remembered the event. The stronger direction to imagine 
in the first group induced greater memory creation, which indicates that imagery may 
affect false memories. However, the use of imagery does n o t  fully explain memory 
creation because highly unusual events may not be falsely remembered even when 
imagined vividly and presented with credible sources. Therefore, the suggested 
information also has to connect in some other way, perhaps t o  existing autobiographical 
schemas or scripts in memory.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
One exploration o f  the role o f autobiographical scripts is found in an attempt to 
persuade Catholic students that they had experienced a Jewish ritual and to persuade 
Jewish students that they had experienced a Catholic ritual (Pezdek, Finger, &
Hodge, 1997). As expected, the participants in this study proved highly resistant to the 
suggested event, even though they were told that their parents had supplied the 
information. To clarify this manipulation, the suggested information was presented in 
such a manner that the names of the rituals or associated objects were not included. 
Therefore, we can assume that in order for a memory to be created surrounding a 
suggested event, that event has to contain elements that we view as possible, given the 
constraints o f our autobiographical experiences and memories. This factor has been 
subject to some debate, because it has not yet been determined how well-developed a 
script for an event must be in order for individuals to create a memory surrounding that 
event. Furthermore, evidence suggests that personal experience is not necessary for the 
development o f scripts (Holst & Pezdek, 1992).
The existence o f  autobiographical scripts in memory may interact closely with another 
factor which affects the creation o f  a memory, that is, the production o f self-relevant 
information at the time o f the memory report. Additional research suggests that the more 
self-relevant information an individual produces is linked to higher rates o f  false memory 
creation (Hyman & Pentland, 1996). These two factors may be linked because the act of 
producing the self-relevant information can facilitate the connection o f suggested 
information to similar existing autobiographical scripts. Hyman reasons that the act of 
memory creation is a constructive process combining suggested events with self- 
knowledge, which could further explain the effects seen when individuals produce more 
self-relevant information at the time o f the memory report.
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Memory Creation Model 
The current state o f memory creation work indicates that memory creation is possible. 
Further, research suggests that memory creation appears to have some relation to 
individual differences such as personality characteristics (e.g., hypnotizability and 
dissociativity). Memory creation is also likely to be subject to constraints o f 
autobiographical memory scripts. A  means of consolidating the existing knowledge 
regarding memory creation has been suggested by Ira Hyman. In his memory creation 
model, there are three steps which seem to apply to most cases o f  memory creation. 
Initially, an individual has to judge presented information as plausible. It appears to be 
difficult to implant memories that “fly in the face” of an individual’s history. Hyman 
suggests at least two other elements to memory creation. Individuals have to provide an 
image and narrative to accompany the memory such that the event has to be elaborated to 
include details about the event had it occurred. Finally, people must mistakenly believe 
that the narrative describes a real event that happened to them. Hyman refers to this last 
element as a source misattribution error. This model suggests that researchers can focus 
on separate aspects o f the memory creation process. One example is provided by studies 
investigating the role of plausibility in memory creation. Because the proposed study 
will focus on plausibility, the following discussion provides a review o f the research on 
this aspect o f  memory creation.
Plausibility
Plausibility studies differ from memory creation studies in that the dependent variable 
is a plausibility rating rather than a memory judgement. The primary tool used in these 
studies is the Life Events Inventory (LEI). This scale presents a number o f events that
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8may or may not have happened before the age of ten. Events on this scale range from 
probable (e.g., got sick at school), to improbable (e.g., felt an earthquake). The scale asks 
individuals to rate the events from one to eight, with one indicating that the event 
definitely did not happen and eight indicating that the event definitely did happen. The 
points in between represent intermediate levels o f  uncertainty, or plausibility. Therefore, 
events rated between the end anchors will be events which the subject cannot state with 
certainty whether they did or did not happen.
Although plausibility is studied in a slightly different manner than memory creation, 
research does indicate that many factors which affect memory creation also affect 
plausibility. One similarity between these two types o f studies is that they both use 
endorsement by a credible source (Loftus, 1997, Mazzoni, et al., 1999). Information that 
a family member reports as true may be seen by individuals as reliable information. 
Additionally, the same individual differences which affect memory creation have also 
been implicated to be a factor in plausibility (Heaps & Nash, 1999). Finally, imagining a 
suggested event is also a primary component of plausibility studies, and may influence 
plausibility ratings (Garry, et al., 1996).
Recently, the LEI has been used by Garry et al. (1996) to investigate an effect they 
call imagination inflation. This is the tendency of individuals to inflate plausibility 
ratings after imagining an event. In their study, participants first completed the LEI and 
then were asked to imagine four target events (e.g. gave someone a haircut, broke a 
window with your hand). A brief description of the event was provided, along with 
prompts about what type o f information the subjects might imagine. Finally, the 
participants were asked questions about what they had imagined. The results o f this 
study show a trend for higher plausibility ratings for imagined than non-imagined events.
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Specifically, positive changes in the LEI ratings, collapsed across all subjects, were 9% 
higher for the imagined events than for the non-imagined events. The magnitude o f this 
change is not large, however, it does indicate that imagining events has an effect on 
plausibility.
Later studies have examined other factors that affect plausibility. For instance, 
Mazzoni, et al. (1999) examined whether or not the context o f the imagination phase has 
an effect on plausibility. The method was similar to the previous imagination inflation 
study in that participants were initially given the LEL however, in this study the true 
purpose was masked by requesting participation in an entirely different study. For that 
study they were asked to record one o f  their dreams. When they brought in  their dream 
record, they met with a clinical psychologist who suggested to them that the dream was 
indicative o f  experiencing a  childhood event. The suggested childhood event was one of 
the target items chosen fi'om the initial administration o f  the LEI. Follow-up interviews 
including a second administration of the LEI found that participants rated the suggested 
event as more plausible on the second LEI than they had on the first. The evidence 
suggests that a  credible source can affect plausibility ratings.
Heaps & Nash (1999) used the imagination inflation paradigm to examine the effect o f 
individual differences on imagination inflation. The results are remarkably similar to 
Hyman & Billings’ (1995) findings regarding memory creation and individual 
differences. Imagination inflation was more likely to occur in individuals w ith higher 
scores on scales o f hypnotic suggestibility and dissociation. The authors conclude that 
imagination inflation effects may be partially due to stable, intrinsic cognitive abilities.
Although these studies all include instruction to imagine an event, generally, the 
created image involves the individual who is imagining it. Manning, et al. (2000) found
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that even when participants were asked to imagine the event happening to someone with 
whom they closely identified instead o f happening to themselves, imagination inflation 
remained high for imagined events. Furthermore, when participants were asked to 
imagine events happening to someone with whom they did not identify at all, imagination 
inflation still remained high for imagined events. These results suggest that a very 
influential aspect o f imagination inflation is the act o f imagining the event, and that who 
is in the imagined event is not important. This may indicate that the information 
contained within the images is not nearly as important as the creation o f those images.
The Present Study
In view o f  the evidence, the goal o f the present study is to determine if  plausibility 
ratings are affected by self-generated information. The previously reported plausibility 
work suggests that plausibility ratings can be elevated by imagining an event (Garry, et 
al. 1996), by exposure to suggestion by a credible source (Mazzoni, et al. 1999), or by the 
presence o f  certain personality variables (Heaps & Nash, 1999). Memory creation 
studies indicate that the creation o f a memory is a process also affected by the suggestion 
o f a credible source (Loftus, 1997), by guided imagery (Hyman & Pentland, 1996), or by 
individual differences (Hyman, Billings, & Husband, 1990). Factors which affect 
plausibility, with the exception o f individual differences, are fairly direct suggestive 
techniques which appear to also affect memory creation. However, the magnitude o f the 
effects found in plausibility studies is not very large. One possible explanation is that in 
directing individuals to imagine events researchers may provide additional information 
which bears little or no resemblance to anything the individual has experienced. 
Participants may also show high plausibility ratings if  they are allowed to fill in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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details from similar events they have experienced. Therefore, the present study used a 
very subtle suggestion. Participants were simply asked to describe a target event with 
minimal input from the researcher. Rather than being directed to imagine the event, they 
were instructed to describe the event as it might have happened to them. The type o f 
instruction used in earlier studies is not the only modification in the present study.
A criticism o f earlier work is the difficulty o f using traditional statistical analysis in 
the analysis of LEI scores. Because the target items are chosen prior to seeing how 
people respond to those items, there is no consistency in scores across the sample; for 
example, pre-chosen target items can receive any score between one and eight. The 
present study chose target items for each participant after the participant had completed 
the scale. This allowed target items to be chosen by virtue o f the reported score, 
therefore, the target items were aU items which were rated similarly.
Another concern regarding plausibility studies is that the effects seen may arise from 
familiarity. If  familiarity is responsible for higher plausibility ratings, then the results 
become more difficult to interpret because events may not become more plausible but 
simply more familiar. To address this problem the present study introduced related but 
novel items on the second administration of the LEI. The responses to these items should 
not be affected by familiarity. These related items may also indicate the stability o f  
plausibility. If  plausibility is high for items related to but distinct from the target items, it 
may indicate that plausibility can generalize to similar items.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the effect o f self-generated 
information on plausibility ratings of events. Participants took the LEI, and after a one- 
week delay they returned for the plausibility scenario phase and the second 
administration of the LEI. The instructions to participants were minimal, simply to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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describe the event as it might have happened to them. The second LEI included novel yet 
related events.
Modifying earlier studies in these ways may respond to criticisms or problems of 
those studies. This study has two hypotheses. First, it is hypothesized that the self- 
generation o f information regarding implausible autobiographical events will lead to an 
increase in plausibility ratings. Second, it is hypothesized that plausibility ratings will 
increase for novel, related items as well as for original items. This finding could support 
the suggestion that memory is a very constructive process, and suggested events may 
facilitate the acceptance of similar events as possible.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students at the University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas. 
Extra course credit was offered for their participation. Sixty-seven individuals completed 
the first phase o f  the study, and fifty-five individuals (42 women and 13 men) returned to 
complete the second phase.
Materials
A 20-item Life Events Inventory (LEI)(Appendix A), developed and modified fi'om 
the original 40-item scale by Garry, et al. (1996) was used in the first session. The items 
describe events to which the participant is asked to rate on a scale fi'om one (definitely 
did not happen) to eight (definitely did happen) whether or not the event happened to 
them before the age of ten. One item was modified for the purposes o f  this study. The 
item originally read “shook hands with the President,” and due to the relative infi'equency 
of that event occurring was changed to “shook hands with a famous person.” Four target 
items fi’om the 20-item LEI were chosen for each participant, these items were two low 
plausibility (ratings of 2 or 3) and two high plausibility items (ratings o f 6 or 7).
The post-test LEI (Appendix B) was revised to include one related item for 
each original item. Five related items for each original item were chosen by the
13
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researcher and pre-tested on a group who were asked to rank the relatedness o f those five 
items to the original item. The related item with the highest average relatedness ranking 
was chosen for inclusion in the post-test. For example, the original item “got sick while 
at school” was most closely related to the item “were sent to the nurse’s office,” which 
was then included on the revised LEI. The 40 items were randomized for the revised 
LEI, and all original LEI items were included in this version.
Procedure
All participants engaged, individually, in two sessions. During the first session the 
individual filled out the 20-item LEI and a demographic sheet (e.g., age, gender, student 
status). After completing the scale, they were scheduled for a second session at least one 
week later. In the interim, the target items for each participant were chosen by the 
researcher, dependent upon the individual’s original responses. Two high plausibility 
and two low plausibility items were used in the plausibility scenario phase o f the study.
The plausibility scenario phase took place during the second session, at least one 
week after the first. Participants were told that four events had been chosen at random 
from their original LEI. The presentation o f high plausibility items and low plausibility 
items was alternated so that every other participant described both high plausibility items 
first and both low plausibility items second. This procedure was reversed for the rest o f 
the participants. They were then given instruction that for each event presented to them, 
they were to describe it as if  it had happened to them, though some o f the events may 
have been events they indicated had probably not happened to them. I f  the participant 
had difficulty describing an event, they were prompted with additional suggestions
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concerning what type o f information they could report about the memory. Most of the 
participants had very little difficulty describing events that did not happen to them.
After the participants described the events, they were given a word puzzle to work 
on for five minutes. Finally, participants were given the revised LEI and debriefed.
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS
Demographic information about the sample includes age, gender, current college 
status and marital status. The sample primarily consisted o f single females between the 
ages o f  21 and 25 in their junior year o f college. Seventy-five percent o f the sample 
listed English as their first language.
Table 1
General Demographic Data
Primarv Grouping Subgroup N %
Gender Male 13 23.6
Female 42 76.4
Age 16-20 22 40.0
21-25 26 47.3
26-30 5 9.1
36-40 1 1.8
404- 1 1.8
Year in College Freshman 4 7.3
Sophomore 10 18.2
Junior 25 45.5
Senior 16 29.1
English as first Yes 41 74.5
language No 14 25.5
16
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The results o f  this study have similarities to  other studies o f  this type using the Life 
Experiences Inventory (Garry, et al, 1996, Hyman & Pentland, 1996). Individuals who 
were exposed to the manipulation subsequently showed change in their ratings o f  those 
events. A simple examination o f means for pre-test and post-test scores on all three 
conditions indicate that low plausibility items had the highest degree o f change, high 
plausibility items had only a small degree o f  change, and control items showed almost no 
change at all. Recall that the high and low plausibility items were chosen because the 
participants indicated the events probably had or had not happened to them, therefore, the 
differences in the pre-test scores are expected. However, the most dramatic change did 
occur in the case o f  low plausibility items which supports the hypothesis that the 
plausibility scenario would lead to higher post-test estimations o f plausibility.
Further analysis using a repeated measures ANOVA reveals a significant interaction 
between test and condition, F(2, 108) = 10.31, MSE =  2.739, p < .01. The simple effect 
for low plausibility items was significant, F (l, 54) = 16.50, MSE = 2.739, p < .01. The 
high plausibility items and the control items were non significant. These results are as 
expected, and support the hypothesis that the self-generation o f information can cause the 
same type o f effects as more structured imagination exercises.
Pretest Posttest
O Low ; O High; pCorrtrof
Figure 1. Mean scores on pre-test and post-test for low 
plausibility, high plausibility, and control items.
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The above analyses were run on ail items within the three groups with no regard to 
item. While these results do provide support for the hypothesis, there is much variation 
in the items chosen as targets, and in the types o f movement seen on those items. Further 
analyses examined these factors. A  table showing the low plausibility condition 
responses indicates that 38% o f the responses increased from the pre-test to the post-test, 
25% of the responses decreased, and 36% o f  the responses stayed the same. The average 
increase was 3.98 points (out o f an eight point scale) and the average decrease was 1.55. 
The above percentages also indicate subgroups in the sample, that is, 38% o f  respondents 
increased their rating o f plausibility as a result o f the manipulation. This finding is 
slightly higher than the findings o f other studies, which typically find 25% o f the 
respondents’ ratings increase as a result o f  imagining the events. One possible 
explanation for the higher percentage o f  respondents who view events as more plausible 
when they generate information about the event themselves is that the information they 
generate is more likely to fit their autobiographical schemas than information given to 
them by researchers.
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Table 2
Low Plausibility Item Responses
Item #Sub # Increase Ave. Pts. #Decr. Ave. Pts. # Same
Low PI. I 2 2 4 - - -
Low PI. 2 2 1 .66 1 .5 -
Low PI. 3 9 2 4 3 1 4
Low PI. 4 14 4 3 4 1 6
Low PI. 5 1 - - - - 1
Low PI. 6 5 1 4 2 1 2
Low PI. 7 3 1 6 2 .66 -
Low PI. 8 1 1 4 - - -
Low PI. 9 11 2 3 3 1.66 6
Low PI. 10 15 - 8 3.5 2 1 5
Low PL 11 2 1 1 1 5 -
Low PI. 12 1 - - - - 1
Low PI. 13 13 6 6.16 3 1.33 4
Low PI. 14 5 - - 1 2 4
Low PI. 15 - - - - - -
Low PI. 16 4 2 5 2 2 -
Low PI. 17 - - - - - -
Low PI. 18 14 7 3.42 2 2 5
Low PI. 19 3 2 5.5 - - 1
Low PI. 20 5 2 6.5 2 1 1
Totals 110 42 3.98 28 1.55 40
Note. #Sub = how many subjects chose that item as a target item; #  Increase = how 
many subjects increased their plausibility estimate; # Decrease = how many subjects 
decreased their plausibility estimate; # Same = how many subjects showed no change in 
their plausibility estimate. Ave. Pts. =  the average amount o f  change on each item.
The same example for control items shows that responses on these items increase for 
19% of the responses, decrease for 15% of the responses, and remain the same for 65% of 
the responses. There is much less movement on the scale for control items, though the 
average increase was 2.79 points and the average decrease was 2.68. These numbers may 
simply be the result o f  a small number of individuals who changed their rating 
dramatically, however, the most important result is that 65% o f the control items
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showed no change between pre-test and post-test. This can be contrasted with the finding 
on low plausibility items where only 38% of the items showed no change between pre­
test and post-test.
Table 3
Control Item Responses
Item # Sub # Increase Ave. Pts. # Deer. Ave. Pts. # Same
Control 1 43 6 3.83 8 2.37 29
Control 2 50 12 3.66 11 2.72 27
Control 3 42 8 2.87 7 2.42 27
Control 4 33 9 2.66 4 2.25 20
Control 5 46 8 3.62 9 1.77 29
Control 6 47 11 3.27 6 4 30
Control 7 49 15 3.06 7 2.42 27
Control 8 40 12 4.08 8 2.62 20
Control 9 32 6 2 11 2.90 15
Control 10 38 9 1.88 8 2.62 21
Control 11 53 4 1.25 5 2.80 44
Control 12 46 9 3.88 3 3.66 34
Control 13 33 6 2.83 4 2 23
Control 14 50 8 2.37 5 2.8 37
Control 15 53 8 3 4 3.25 41
Control 16 50 11 2.81 12 2.25 27
Control 17 53 3 1.33 4 3.75 46
Control 18 33 9 2.55 5 1.60 19
Control 19 42 10 2.40 5 1.40 27
Control 20 47 8 2.62 6 4 33
Totals 880 172 2.79 132 2.68 576
Note. #Sub = how many subjects chose that item as a target item; # Increase = how 
many subjects increased their plausibility estimate; #  Decrease = how many subjects 
decreased their plausibility estimate; # Same = how many subjects showed no change in 
their plausibility estimate. Ave. Pts. = the average amount o f change on each item.
The analysis o f  low plausibility items and control items reflect not only research 
findings from previous research but also support the hypothesis o f the present study. It is
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expected that control items will see little change and low plausibility items will be more 
susceptible to change. However, this study included high plausibility items and the 
results for these items is more difficult to explain.
The high plausibility item responses were very similar to the low plausibility 
responses in that they decreased from pre-test to post-test on 33% o f  the responses, 
increased on 28% o f the responses, and stayed the same on 38% o f  the responses. These 
percentages can be compared to the low plausibility responses, at 38%, 25%, and 36%, 
respectively. The average increase for these items was 1.77 points, and the average 
decrease was 3.9 points. This wide difference between the amount o f increase and the 
amount o f decrease per item can probably be explained by a ceiling effect. The high 
plausibility items were chosen because they were rated at a 5 or higher, and on the eight 
point scale that only allows upward movement o f  a couple of points. The reason for the 
decrease may be an unforeseen result o f the manipulation.
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Table 4
High Plausibility Item Responses
Item #Sub # Increase Ave. Pts. #D ecr. AveJPts- # Same
High PI. 1 10 3 1 4 3.25 3
High PI. 2 3 1 .5 1 6 1
High PI. 3 4 - - 3 5.33 1
High PL 4 8 2 2 2 3 4
High PL 5 8 4 1.5 1 5 3
High PL 6 3 2 1 - - 1
High PL 7 3 1 2 1 1 1
High PL 8 14 6 1.5 1 3 7
High PL 9 12 2 1.5 3 4 7
High PL 10 2 1 5 - - 1
High PL 11 - - - - - -
High PL 12 8 4 1 1 5 3
High PL 13 9 1 1 3 3.33 5
High PL 14 - - - - - -
High PL 15 2 1 1 1 5 -
High PL 16 1 - - 1 5 -
High PL 17 2 - - 1 5 1
High PL 18 8 5 1.6 2 3 1
High PL 19 10 3 1 4 3.75 3
High PL 20 3 1 5 2 2 -
Totals 110 37 1.77 31 3.9 42
Note. #Sub =  how many subjects chose that item as a target item; # Increase = how 
many subjects increased their plausibility estimate; #  Decrease = how many subjects 
decreased their plausibility estimate; #  Same = how many subjects showed no change in 
their plausibility estimate. Ave. Pts. =  the average amount o f change on each item.
The means for related items were all very similar. Low plausibility related items 
yielded a mean o f 4.6, high plausibility related items had a mean o f  4.9, and control 
plausibility related items had a mean o f  4.7. These results indicate that the hypothesis 
concerning related items, primarily the supposition that related item plausibility ratings 
may also go up as a result of the plausibility scenario is not supported. The hypothesized 
result would have shown that the post-test related item means were reflecting the same
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pattern as the post-test means for all three types o f items. The events may not be closely 
enough related to be highly likely to only occur in conjunction with the original event, or 
the effect does not spread to related items.
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION
Memory serves an important fiinction in defining the individual. A  large body o f 
literature supports the fact that memory is not completely stable over time and can be 
naodified as a result o f a number of types o f events. Most o f the time, small 
naodifications go unnoticed. In the case o f  memory creation, however, modification can 
have serious ramifications for individuals and their families. The recent surge in 
literature addressing this memory creation strives to understand how and under what 
conditions it can occur. A  preliminary step to this understanding is the memory creation 
naodel, in which Hyman suggests that three steps seems to be present in most cases of 
naemory creation to occur. Plausibility is the first o f  these three steps.
The existing plausibility literature examines different conditions or characteristics that 
miay affect plausibility judgments. Though only a  small number o f studies addressing this 
question have been done, there does seem to be evidence to support the theory that 
innagining an event can inflate plausibility ratings. The present study found that 
innagination may not be the only thing which causes plausibility judgments to go up.
The major result o f this study is that describing an unlikely autobiographical event 
changes the plausibility rating o f that event. This change in plausibility ratings is likely 
to* be in the form of movement from less plausible to more plausible, though slight 
movement in the other direction is found. These findings are consistent with those o f
24
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previous research. Other studies using the Life Events Inventory indicate that imagining 
an event increases the plausibility o f  that event (Garry, et al, 1996; Heaps & Nash, 1999; 
Manning & Loftus, 2000), or that suggestion from a well-known therapist can increase 
plausibility o f  events (Mazzoni, et al, 1999). There is high similarity o f results between 
these previous studies and the present study.
Table 6
Comparison o f Present Studv to Previous Research
Present Study Garry, et al 
(1996)
Heaps & Nash, 
(1999)
Manning & 
Loftus, (2000)
Positive Change 
in Target Items 
Positive Change 
in Non-Target 
Items
38% o f subjects 
19% o f subjects
34% of subjects 
25% o f subjects
22.6% o f 
subjects 
14.5% o f  
subjects
34% of subjects 
28% o f subjects
Earlier studies and the present study share a similar methodology as well as similar 
results. The basic method involves a pre-test administration o f the Life Events Inventory, 
followed by some type o f manipulation, and ending with another administration of the 
LEI. The procedure typically differs in the type o f manipulation. The first study to use 
the LEI (Garry, et al, 1996) presented participants with instructions to imagine the events 
and then described the setting and salient aspects o f the event to be imagined. Both 
Heaps & Nash, (1999) and Manning and Loftus, (2000) used this type o f manipulation. 
The present study changed this manipulation to one in which participants were asked to 
describe the event and they were not given any other information about the course o f the 
event to be described. The concern regarding the imagination instructions is twofold; 
first, that the additional information given may direct participant away from being able to
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interpret the event in the context o f  their own autobiographical experiences, and second, 
that the additional information may not be necessary to induce the increase in plausibility 
ratings. The present study cannot speak to the first concern, because the change in 
ratings is so similar across all four studies. However, that similarity does indicate that an 
increase in the likelihood or plausibility o f  unlikely autobiographical events can take 
place without strong suggestion to  imagine an event that is partially already created.
Another difference between this study and earlier studies is that the target items were 
chosen as a result o f the participants score, that is, low plausibility items began that way, 
and earlier studies used predetermined target items which means that at least part of the 
sample had high plausibility ratings for those events. The slightly higher number of 
participants in the present study who increased their plausibility ratings may be as a result 
o f  this manipulation. All the participants began the plausibility scenario with two low 
rated items, therefore, participants were free to move up the scale as a reflection of the 
change in plausibility judgment, but restricted in their ability to show negative change 
due to a floor effect on those items.
The last major difference between the present study and previous work is the addition 
o f novel items that were related to the original items. The hypothesis regarding these 
items was that the plausibility scenario might affect events closely related to the target 
events. That result was not found in the present study, and may be due to a flaw in the 
design. Either the plausibility judgments are not inclined to change for related events, or 
the related events are too distinct from the original events.
Garry, et al (1996) has suggested that one o f the possible explanations for the increase 
in plausibility ratings may be familiarity to the events. The present study attempted to 
compensate for familiarity issues by setting a one-week period between pre-test and
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post-test and by revising the post-test version of the LEI so that it was different from the 
pre-test. However, the results o f the present study may provide the best evidence 
contradicting effects o f  familiarity. Target items show an increase in plausibility and a 
decrease in plausibility. The increase is more dramatic, but the decrease is present. In 
fact, means on all types of items showed a small decrease. The question then becomes 
one o f how events become less familiar, and in response to that question another 
explanation might warrant examination.
Small changes in plausibility ratings could result from problems in the scale itself 
because the difference in likelihood between two and three or six and seven may be 
difficult for participants to define. The question would be whether or not participants 
view a score of six as being very close in plausibility to seven or whether those two 
points on the scale are seen as being distinct. Therefore, average increases and decreases 
in plausibility ratings o f one or two points might be due to an inability to distinguish 
between two very close points on the scale. This is a problem which requires further 
research, however, in the present study the control item responses remain the same for 
65% o f the sample. It would appear that for some items, difficulty in distinguishing close 
points on the scale is not a concern. Additionally, the mean positive change for low 
plausibility items in this study was almost four points, which moves items from the low 
plausibility end o f the scale to the high plausibility end. This amount of change would 
probably be less difficult for participants to distinguish because the fundamental meaning 
o f the rating changes. Though scaling problems may be a factor in some of the results, 
they certainly do not explain the high levels of change seem on low plausibility items.
The preliminary nature o f  this study also needs to be considered. Normative and 
analytic data has not yet been collected on the Life Events Inventory itself and there may
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be other factors or variables not yet understood which affect responses to the ratings. A 
possible weakness o f this study is that plausibility ratings may change as a result o f  some 
mechanism other than a change in the perceived plausibility o f  these events. For 
instance, if  a number o f  the responses are triggering memory for real events which for 
some reason cannot be completely reclaimed, the results would not be indicative o f a 
plausibility judgment, but o f  memory recall.
Research is needed to establish the reliability and validity o f  this scale. Understanding 
how normal the events are for a large sample could also assist in interpreting results from 
the scale, perhaps even lead to modifications which would make it more useful in this 
type o f research. Factor analysis could also be performed and might indicate whether any 
o f the events are connected to each other in ways that are not yet understood.
The relative scarcity o f  research can be addressed by further studies, and the inherent 
weaknesses of this study can be controlled through modifications to the design, however, 
this type of work is important for clarifying the processes involved in memory creation. 
Regardless of the possible causes, individuals who indicate that something probably did 
not happen to them can be induced through very simple procedures to claim that the 
event might have happened to them. Repeated instances o f  this type o f process could be 
implicated in cases o f  memory creation.
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A P P E N D IX  A
ORIGINAL LIFE E V E N T S INVEN TO RY
Life Events Inventory
Below are some events that may or may not have happened to you before you were 10 years old. For each 
event indicate how certain you are that the event (or a very siniilar event) did or did not happen to you by 
circling one o f the numbers on the right Mark-1 only if  you are completely confident that the event did not 
happen to you. And, mark 8 only if  you are completely confident that the event did happeru
Before you were about 10 years old you.
Definitely did Definitely did
not happen happen
1. got sick while at school 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. shook hands with someone famous.....................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. ran away firom hom e............................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. cried when you had to go to the dentist............................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5. adopted a lost animal............................................................... ........... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6. kissed a boy or girl at school.................................................. ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7. saw a solar eclipse................................................................... .............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. saw an R-rated m ovie........................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9. were lost in a public place for more than an hour................ ........... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10. found $10 in a parking lot..................................................... ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
11. got in trouble for calling 911................................................ ............1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
12. felt an earthquake................................................................... ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
13. had to go to the emergency room late at night.................... ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
14. had someone pull you fi-om the water.................................. ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
15. had your house robbed.......................................................... ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
16. had to have someone help you out o f a tree........................ ............ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
29
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17. broke a window with your band 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
18. cheated on a test 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
19. won a prize at a carnival game 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
20. gave someone a haircut........................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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A PPEND IX  B
E X TEN D ED  LIFE EV ENTS IN V E N T O R Y
[Note: This extended version o f the LEI is presented in order to show the original items (O) with the 
related items (R) following. For use with participants, the items were listed randomly.]
Life Events hivenfory
Below are some events that may or may not have happened to you before you were 10 years old. For each 
event indicate how certain you are that the event (or a very sindlar event) did or did not happen to you by 
circling one o f the numbers on the right. Mark 1 only i f  you are completely confident that the event did not 
happen to you. And, mark 8 only if  you are completely confident that the event did happen.
Before you were about 10 years old you..........
Definitely did Definitely did
not happen h ^ p e n
1. got sick at school (O) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. were sent to the nurse’s office (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. shook hands with someone famous (O) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. wrote to a movie star (R).............................................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5. ran away firom home (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6. got yelled at for bad behavior (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7. cried when you had to go to the dentist (O).................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. felt pain when the dentist filled a tooth (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9. adopted a lost animal (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10. bought a leash and collar for a dog (R)........................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
11. kissed a boy or girl at school (O)................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
12. held hands with your first girl/boyfiiend (R)................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
13. saw a solar eclipse (O).....................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
14. were told not to look directly at the sun (R)................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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15. saw an R-rated movie (O ) 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
16. lied to your parents about what movie you’d seen (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
17. were lost in a public place for more than an hour (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
18. had someone page your parents over an intercom (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
19. found $10 in  a parking lot (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
20. turned found money into the authorities (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
21. got in trouble for calling 911 (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
22. had to apologize to the target o f a prank (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
23. felt an earthquake (O ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
24. were jostled out o f sleep by movement (R)..................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
25. had to go to the emergency room late at night (O )......................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
26. woke up feeling very sick (R)............................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
27. had someone pull you from the water (O)....................................................... 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
28. had trouble learning how to swim (R).............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
29. had your house robbed (O ).................................................................................1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
30. had something important to you taken away (R)............................................ 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
31. had to have someone help you out of a tree (O)..............................................1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
32. got yelled at for getting stuck in a tree (R)...................................................... 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
33. broke a window with your hand...(O).................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
34. got stitches (R)...................................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
35. cheated on a test (O ).............................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
36. got a good grade you didn’t deserve (R)........................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
37. won a prize at a carnival game (O)........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
38. displayed a prize you won in your room (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
39. gave someone a haircut (O).....................................................................................1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
40. got a lecture about using scissors (R).................................................................... 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8
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